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Religious Freedom and Public Argument: John
Courtney Murray on “The American Proposition”
Robin W. Lovin*
In his classic essays in We Hold These Truths, John Courtney Murray
developed an understanding of “the American proposition” that integrated
a theological account of human good with the search for public consensus
in a constitutional democracy. While this understanding of the relationship
between religious freedom and political life was incorporated into Catholic
social teaching at the Second Vatican Council, subsequent developments in
both political theory and theology call Murray’s understanding of public
discourse into question. This essay examines these challenges and argues
that Murray’s reconciliation of moral truth and political choice is still an
important resource for discussion of religious freedom and other moral
issues in today’s polarized politics.
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INTRODUCTION
From the late 1940s through the Second Vatican Council, John
Courtney Murray devoted himself to two related tasks. One was
theological and ecclesiastical: making a case for religious freedom as a
Catholic doctrine, essential to the Catholic understanding of human
dignity.1 The other was political and social: explaining the Catholic
doctrine in relation to an American constitutional system that enacted
* Cary Maguire University Professor of Ethics emeritus, Southern Methodist University; Visiting
Scholar in Theology, Loyola University Chicago.
1. See, e.g., JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, Religious Freedom, in FREEDOM AND MAN 134–35
(John Courtney Murray ed., 1965) (arguing that the right to religious freedom belongs to the
individual).
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freedom of religion primarily through the institutional separation of
church and state.2 Taken together, these two tasks suggested a dialogue
between church and state that would establish the practical meaning of
religious freedom under the concrete conditions of a pluralistic
democracy. These are large tasks. Both remain unfinished, and both are
still important.
This essay focuses primarily on the second task, the political and social
one, which Murray addressed in his best-known work on public theology,
We Hold These Truths.3 Murray was always clear about the importance
of first principles, whether in doctrine or in law. But he understood that
principles alone do not settle all questions in relation to matters of policy.4
One must understand first principles to allow clarity regarding the goals
and purposes one takes up when considering the complex and essentially
disputed questions of how to achieve those goals in relation to a particular
social and historical context. Thus, Murray might regard it as appropriate
to define the parameters of religious freedom by beginning, not with the
specific questions of policy that become the focus of litigation and public
attention, but with a reconsideration of the “American proposition” that
he reflected on in We Hold These Truths.5 The question we must today
pose against Murray’s work is basic: Is there an “American proposition”
for us to reflect on? Or, to use another of Murray’s formulations, is there
a “public consensus” about the terms of our life as a nation and as a
society?6
Given all that has changed in the world since Murray wrote We Hold
These Truths, it is hardly surprising that the way we think about the
“American proposition” has changed, too. That means that theologians
have to re-examine the relationship between Christian truth and the
“public consensus” as it exists today. Indeed, they must ask whether a
public consensus exists today. Does Christianity relate to the American
proposition as a dialogue partner? Or as a prophetic critic? Or simply as
another tradition nostalgic for a vanished past?
I. MURRAY’S LEGACY
This phrasing of the questions has a skeptical edge that might have
2. For an intellectual biography that traces the development of both aspects of Murray’s work,
see BARRY HUDOCK, STRUGGLE, CONDEMNATION, VINDICATION: JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY’S
JOURNEY TOWARD VATICAN II (2015).
3. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE
AMERICAN PROPOSITION (2005).
4. Id. at 143.
5. Id. at 5.
6. Id. at 87.
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annoyed Murray, who, in 1960, was still trying to convince Protestants
that Catholics could be good Americans and to convince his Catholic
critics that American constitutional arrangements were consistent with
Catholic truth.7 When Murray and his editor began to assemble the essays
that went into We Hold These Truths, the Second Vatican Council had
only just been called.8 The mass movement that would change civil rights
law, race relations, and a whole range of religious and social institutions
in the United States was just beginning. Relationships between religion,
state, and culture, as the Roman Catholic Church had observed them from
Leo XIII through Pius XII were about to change dramatically.
Murray anticipated many of these changes. He devoted the last years
of his life to the racial justice work of the John LaFarge Institute, and his
work on the relationship between human dignity and religious freedom
during the Second Vatican Council has had global implications for the
life of the church.9 But, to determine how Murray might have responded
to the issues of religious freedom today, we must extrapolate from ideas
that he formulated before the events that frame our questions.
It is likewise important to remember that Murray’s Catholic reflections
on American public life were written well before some of the
sociological, philosophical, and theological works that set the terms for
our contemporary discussion of the problems that occupied his attention.
In 1960, neither Robert Bellah’s essay, Civil Religion in America, nor
John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice had been published.10 Murray’s
reflections established a relationship between Catholic thought and the
American proposition by locating the origins of constitutionalism
squarely within the tradition of natural law.11 This was not without
intellectual precedent,12 but in 1960, this Catholic reinterpretation faced
no significant competition from sociological accounts that interpreted
distinctive American ideas and events as symbols of social cohesion. Nor
did it face competition from liberal political theories that narrowed the
terms of political life to the rational requirements of liberty and equality,
with no need for arguments built on elaborate accounts of human nature
7. See generally MURRAY, supra note 3; see also HUDOCK, supra note 2, at 105–06 (explaining
the role that Murray played in John F. Kennedy’s presidential campaign).
8. HUDOCK, supra note 2, at 102.
9. Id. at 47; see also id. at 105–06.
10. See generally Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 96 DAEDALUS 1, 1–21 (1967);
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
11. See MURRAY, supra note 3, at 51–52 (explaining that “[t]he philosophy of the Bill of Rights
was . . . tributary to the tradition of natural law, to the idea that man has certain original
responsibilities precisely as man, antecedent to his status as citizen”).
12. For an earlier example of natural law interpretation, see EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE “HIGHER
LAW” BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1955).
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or human goods.13
The competing positions that Murray had in view came from legal
positivism and from various economic accounts of the origins of political
power.14 These were, and are, genuine alternatives to a politics based on
shared core values. But they had limited appeal in the American context
of the 1950s, and Murray had little difficulty outlining an account of
political authority based on consent and limited by law.15 Under this
statement of the “American proposition,” he could then place a
foundation of ideas that were articulated by the founders of the republic
and have a history that reaches far back into the traditions of natural law.
“‘Free government’—perhaps this typically American shorthand phrase
sums up the consensus. ‘A free people under a limited government’ puts
the matter more exactly. It is a phrase that would have satisfied the first
Whig, St. Thomas Aquinas.”16
With this progress toward an American consensus that would be
susceptible to a Catholic interpretation, Murray could not easily have
anticipated the rise of a political philosophy that would see a fully
developed natural law account as a threat to the consensus, rather than as
a foundation for it. From its publication in 1971, John Rawls’s A Theory
of Justice set the terms for a theoretical understanding of political
liberalism.17 Rawls’s aim was to secure agreement on the requirements
of justice by minimizing the need for agreement on human goods and
human nature. Once the basics of a theory of justice are worked out,
Rawls explained, we can use them for development of “the full theory of
the good.”18 But we cannot build a theory of justice on a full theory of
the good.
If Murray could not have anticipated these developments in liberal
political theory, he would surely have been even more surprised by the
reaction of some religious thinkers who moved from activist engagement
with the problems of American society to a critical distance on its
founding principles. Their reflections on the American proposition saw
liberalism as designed to exclude their views of human nature, political
history, and social relationships from the public square.19 Instead of
13. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 46–48.
14. See id. at 47, where he briefly dismisses legal positivism and Marxism. In constructing his
American consensus, Murray aligns himself with leading public intellectuals of his day, including
Adolf Berle and Walter Lippman, to formulate an account of authority that rests on consent rather
than on power. Id. at 106–09 (discussing the public consensus and economic experience).
15. Id. at 47.
16. Id.
17. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 396.
18. Id.
19. See generally RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND
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casting Saint Thomas Aquinas as the first Whig, as Murray did, some
Aristotelian and Thomist philosophers discovered that the beginnings of
liberalism marked the end of coherent public ethics.20 Under the
influence of a freedom that lacks goods and goals, modern political ethics
has disintegrated into fragments that retain the terms of moral traditions
without their substance.21 By the time two decades had passed after We
Hold These Truths was published, the reconciliation of political
liberalism and natural law seemed far less promising than when Murray
labored over his essays during the 1950s. The differences seem even more
pronounced today. Recent analyses of our public life and public discourse
are sharply divided between those who see an Enlightenment skepticism
about ultimate questions as the only basis on which to construct a free
and equal society and those who see political liberalism as the ultimate
failure of the Enlightenment project.22 The forces Murray hoped to
marshal into his American consensus now take his moderate and
mediating insights in radically different directions.
So where should we locate Murray’s work among these contending
forces? Would he still speak confidently to an American public about the
natural law foundations of their constitutional freedoms? Or would he
now be among those for whom religious freedom means the freedom to
create an alternative community, insulated from secular demands that
contradict their religious vision? What do we still owe to Murray, and
what does his legacy imply for our polarized views of politics today?
II. THE PUBLIC ARGUMENT
Notably, we owe Murray for his approach to the basic question
whether there is a “public consensus” or an “American proposition.”23 It
is easy to say that Murray came from a simpler age when everyone
assumed that public life has moral and religious foundations. (That is
especially easy to say if you are a theologian trying to explain why
nobody pays attention to theologians anymore.) If we just know that there
is something like an American proposition, we can move at once to
explaining its contents and identifying its sources. But Murray never
simply assumes the existence of the social and intellectual frameworks
he wants to review from a Catholic perspective. He constructs them; and
not as straw men he can knock down, but with profound respect even for

DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1984).
20. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 2–3 (2007).
21. Id.
22. See infra Section V (discussing this contemporary polarization of political thought).
23. See generally MURRAY, supra note 3, at 43–57.

30

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 50

those ideas and thinkers he intends to call into question.24 He understands
that the questions he is raising are part of a “public argument,”25 and the
price of admission to that argument is showing that you understand the
case that your interlocutor is making.
Murray clearly had that price of admission in hand as he wrote We
Hold These Truths. If he were here today seeking admission to the public
argument, the question is whether there would be anyone to take his
ticket. Public discourse now seems chiefly about mobilizing people who
already agree with you and directing their thinking toward a more
consistent and comprehensive ideological position. It helps in that task if
you can convince yourself and your hearers that there are no good
arguments on the other side, that those who oppose you are motivated by
self-interest or misled by false consciousness. Rallying the base begins
by reducing your opponent’s position to a tweet.
Murray might not have anticipated the specific directions of
contemporary political philosophy, but he would recognize the problems
with our public discourse. “Argument ceases to be civil when it is
dominated by passion and prejudice,” he wrote,
when its vocabulary becomes solipsist, premised on the theory that my
insight is mine alone and cannot be shared; when dialogue gives way to
a series of monologues; when the parties to the conversation cease to
listen to one another, or hear only what they want to hear, or see the
other’s argument only through the screen of their own categories . . . .26

The “public consensus” Murray had in mind was not that kind of
ideological unanimity. The point of public argument is to shape policy
and legislation. Murray was clear about that. But in a civil society, this is
not to be achieved by repeating your demands until everyone else has
been silenced. The public consensus is an agreement on what the
important questions are and, indeed, on a range of possible answers to
those questions that are relevant to our place and time. So public
argument is about refining the case for one or another of those reasonable
alternatives in relation to new knowledge and changing circumstances.
Through argument, some ways of looking at things become more
persuasive and better differentiated from the alternatives, and thus they
establish an intellectual direction that shapes public choices.27
To understand this development from principle to policy in a way that
is relevant to contemporary questions about religious freedom, it is worth
looking again at the way Murray engages the public argument in chapter
24.
25.
26.
27.

See id. at 227–47 (explaining potential counterarguments to public consensus).
Id. at 26.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 79–80.
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six of We Hold These Truths.28 The chapter is an essay on what justice
requires in relation to what was then called “the school question,” a
shorthand for a whole set of constitutional, political, and social problems
that had to be addressed in search of public support for Catholic parochial
schools.29 The question had been around for some time, and it had usually
been settled on constitutional terms that precluded government support.30
The “school question” today would be different from the one that Murray
addressed, partly because of a range of public policy solutions that have
been devised to support curriculum and essential services in private
schools, partly because Catholic schools are no longer “parochial” in
several senses of that term, and partly because the “school question”
today seems to be whether there is going to be public support for public
schools. But important questions about religious freedom remain at the
boundary where public policy touches religious belief, as cases from
various jurisdictions about curriculum, terms of employment, and
admissions guidelines attest.31 The “school question” in its mid-twentieth
century form is less relevant today, but Murray’s way of structuring the
question may still serve as a guide for dealing with some contentious
issues about the boundary between public policy and private choice. For
him, the “school question” was not just about Catholic education. It was
tied up with public questions about what religious freedom means in
contemporary life.
So, what does the question of religious freedom involve, if we look at
it the way Murray looked at the school question? First, the question
involves complex relationships between freedom, justice, and good. The
constitutional commitment to a distinction between public authority and
private belief sets the framework for a dialogue between church and state.
It is a question of justice to competing claims, not a conflict in which faith
must overrule law or law must determine the expression of belief. But it
is also a question on which the requirements of justice change over time,
as society develops and competing goods shift in relation to one another
and in their importance to the common good.
28. See generally id. at 139–48.
29. Id.
30. See RICHARD WHITE, THE REPUBLIC FOR WHICH IT STANDS: THE UNITED STATES DURING
RECONSTRUCTION AND THE GILDED AGE, 1865–1896, at 316–21 (2017) (explaining how the issue
of religion in schools came about and tracing the history of the movement to allow some sort of
religion in certain schools).
31. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 579 (1987) (discussing the constitutionality
of teaching creationism); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S.
171, 199–201 (2012) (applying the equal opportunity law to the selection of religious leaders); R
v. Governing Body of JFS [2009] UKSC 15 (discussing whether use of Jewish religious law to
determine eligibility for admission to a Jewish school is discriminatory).
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Education has become a public good in which the Catholic Church has
a large stake and a large contribution to make, and the policy questions
cannot be decided by views that were framed in the nineteenth century,
when the public school was the single source of education for the public
and society was less pluralist than it is today. 32 Constitutional principles
provide the framework within which a policy must be crafted by
reference to particular circumstances, with a prudent acknowledgement
of the limits to our knowledge. The task, in Murray’s own words, “is to
assemble all the relevant principles, bring them into harmony, and give
them whatever rightful development they may need in the light of today’s
realities.”33 This is an ongoing process, not a single event. There is a place
in the process for those who are committed to particular policy choices,
but the public argument must also pay attention to how we see the
problem. So, Murray does not hesitate to say, “I do not believe that
anyone really sees the solution to this problem; it is much too
complicated. But I do believe that a decisive number of people see the
problem itself.”34 The civil argument, then, is a modest search for interim
answers within a framework where we all agree that there is a problem.
When public argument breaks down, by contrast, participants insist that
the only people who understand the problem are those who agree with the
participants’ solution.
In this kind of public argument, facts matter. We cannot simply read
the correct choices off of the facts, but we cannot have the argument
without some agreement on what is happening and on what the likely
results of any proposed course of action are going to be. If Murray does
not bring this point into focus as clearly as we might like, that is perhaps
because he does not think it is in question, at least within the framework
of a democracy where there is freedom of inquiry and freedom of the
press. That may be another point on which his time is different from ours.
The explosion of social science research, the expansion of policy-driven
research centers and “think tanks,” and the multiplication of internet
outlets basically gives us our choice of facts, and the difficulty of
checking facts encourages us to make them up if the ones we want are
not readily available.
III. THE CASE FOR CONSENSUS
The “public consensus” may be more elusive today than it was when
Murray wrote, but that is not just because there are more things on which
32. See MURRAY, supra note 3, at 147 (“The result [of cooperation between church and state in
public education] will be a more harmonious statement of the full American tradition of the right
relations between government and religion.”).
33. Id. at 145.
34. Id. at 143–44.
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the public disagrees. Nor is the problem that it is harder to get anyone’s
attention in an overloaded media environment and harder still to hold that
attention long enough to say something that they may not want to hear. It
is not even that society is more pluralistic, fragmented, and secular than
it was in Murray’s day. There was plenty of disagreement then, too, and
Murray himself expressed the opinion in 1950 that America was far more
secular in 1950 than it had been ten years before.35
What may be new is the reluctance of some theologians to participate
in the creation of the public consensus.36 Religious freedom today often
seems less to mean the freedom to be heard in the public square than the
freedom to turn one’s back on it and live the faith on one’s own terms.
Murray’s understanding of religious freedom was different, at least when
religious freedom can be lived out in a free society. 37 A free society not
only provides religious liberty, it entails a religious vocation for the
individual Christian, for the Christian community, and more particularly
for the public theologian.
Murray was ready and able to launch an argument about school
funding, censorship, or just war doctrine as if everyone understood the
principles by which a modern democracy ought to approach such
questions. But in more reflective moments, he talked about two cases for
the public consensus.38 One case treats it as a fact, a framework for
argument that is just there to be taken up by whoever wants to enter the
discussion.39 Although he does not hesitate to engage in argument with
those who will grant him that framework, he admits that framework itself
may need repair, and its assumptions are subject to question.40 The case
for the public consensus as fact fails.41
The other case for the public consensus treats it as a need so that the
person who wants to enter an argument about law, or policy, or national
security must, subtly, create the framework in which the argument can go
on in order to state the case.42 The Catholic tradition has an important
35. Joseph A. Komonchak, “The Crisis in Church-State Relationships in the U.S.A.” A Recently
Discovered Text by John Courtney Murray, 61 REV. POL. 675, 687–88 (1999).
36. See, e.g., STANLEY HAUERWAS, AGAINST THE NATIONS: WAR AND SURVIVAL IN A
LIBERAL SOCIETY (1985).
37. See MURRAY, supra note 1, at 134–35.
38. See MURRAY, supra note 3, at 87–93 (noting that the American public philosophy was a
failing one and needed a new moral purpose).
39. Id.
40. See id. at 89–90 (“The case is only outlined here; these bones would need to be clothed with
flesh. And the full case would have to be made both by philosophical and by historical argument.”).
41. See id. at 87–93 (noting that “the argument runs down and out. It ends in negation. On the
question as put, is there an American public philosophy? [T]he Noes will have it. I have about come
to the conclusion that they do have it.”).
42. See id. at 93–95 (explaining public consensus as a need through a discussion of foreign
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contribution to make to this framework in Murray’s account, precisely
because it offers a comprehensive view of the human condition that
illuminates and sets in context the more particular questions that become
the foci of public argument.43 After the Second Vatican Council, Murray
might have added that Catholics are good at this precisely because they
have long experience with a body of doctrine that develops in relation to
changing conditions without losing its unity and identity.
It is hard not to see a connection between what Murray calls “the
growing end” of the public consensus in We Hold These Truths and his
ideas about development of doctrine that made possible the Declaration
on Religious Freedom.44 A public consensus and the body of Catholic
truth are not the same thing. They are not even the same kind of thing.
But those who have a care for the public can identify with and learn from
the skills that theologians use to ensure that fidelity to literal meanings
does not contradict the proclamation of the faith or create stumbling
blocks to its hearing. A democracy that has a history and a constitution
has some of the same problems as a church that has a tradition and a body
of doctrine. In both sorts of arguments, the important thing is “that a
decisive number of people see the problem itself.”45
“Seeing the problem” involves, as always, locating particular questions
about health care policy, education, the protection of life, and the
accommodation of religious practices within a framework for
understanding the purposes of government and the requirements of faith.
To keep these discussions going, in Part Two of We Hold These Truths,
Murray addresses “the school question,” censorship, humanism, and
religious freedom.46 He often frames his position with a question, like “Is
it justice?” or “Should there be a law?”47 Indeed, the title of Part Two as
a whole is “Four Unfinished Arguments.”48 His point seems to be that
economic policy and Communism).
43. See id. (“It may possibly be true to say that an individual man can survive the tests of human
life without religion; I mean, of course, the tests of terrestrial life, not the definitive tests put by
ultimate truth, which are met in the internal forum of the mind and the moral conscience. In any
case, it is not true to say that a nation can survive the tests of terrestrial life without a public
philosophy, least of all in this our day when the very bases even of terrestrial life are being called
into question.”).
44. See id. at 103–09 (explaining that public consensus in America was “essentially a body of
doctrine which has attained wide, if not general acceptance,” but that this wide acceptance
originated within many individuals). See also HUDOCK, supra note 2, at 130 (“When it became
clear to the American bishops—probably through communication with Murray, who was leading
the task of evaluating all of the submitted interventions—that the religious freedom text was
receiving heavy criticism, they mobilized.”).
45. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 143–44.
46. Id. at 139–99.
47. Id. at 139, 149.
48. Id. at 139–99.
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arguments of this scope are supposed to be unfinished.
Murray’s early death in 1967 at age sixty-two lends poignancy to his
unfinished arguments, and scholars have been trying ever since to bring
them to a conclusion. Conferences on the “unfinished agenda” of John
Courtney Murray have been popular since the 1970s,49 and variations on
the policy questions he addressed continue to occupy public attention.
But, there is a difference between an interminable argument and an
unfinished one. In an interminable argument, the parties are no longer
listening to one another. Arguments remain unfinished when there are
still unanswered questions that the parties share. Following Murray, then,
I will state my case for the public consensus in two questions: “Is it
good?” and “Is it politics?” Continuing the argument about religious
freedom on Murray’s terms requires us to answer both questions, and to
recognize the difference between them.
IV. IS IT GOOD?
First, “Is it good?” For Murray, this was a background question,
perhaps the most basic background question, in all public discussions
about liberty and policy. In his work, the question about the good
provided a connection between the Catholic conception of the common
good and the public goods of justice, domestic tranquility, common
defense, general welfare, and durable liberty articulated in the preamble
to the Constitution. However deep the disagreements might go, the
argument was about what is good, and it could not be reduced to a
question of who has the power or settled by a trade-off between
competing interests. Since Murray wrote, however, the background
question has itself become the subject of argument. We have already seen
how Rawls’s theory of justice at least postpones questions about the good
until after the principles of justice have been settled.50 This “lexical”
priority of questions about justice over questions about the good may
seem a modest proposal, but as David Hollenbach has pointed out, it calls
into question the central place that the idea of the common good has in
Catholic social thought: “John Rawls speaks for many observers in the
West today when he says that the pluralism of the contemporary
landscape makes it impossible to envision a social good on which all can
agree.”51 The development of a complete account of the good may be
theoretically permissible once the requirements of justice are in place.
But the persistent questions about justice in modern society make it
49. See, e.g., David Hollenbach et al., Theology and Philosophy in Public: A Symposium on
John Courtney Murray’s Unfinished Agenda, 40 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 700, 701 (1979) (explaining
how Murray’s death led scholars to question the adequacy of his methods in the current context).
50. See generally RAWLS, supra note 10.
51. DAVID HOLLENBACH, THE COMMON GOOD AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 9 (2002).
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unlikely that a public argument carried out on Rawls’s terms will get
much beyond the “thin” theory of the good that is necessary to launch the
inquiry about justice in the first place. Indeed, Rawls’s later work, in
which he is more attentive to the actual conditions of political discourse,
makes it clear that the development of a full theory of the good could not
be carried out on any large scale in a society that is both pluralistic and
free.52 Isaiah Berlin regards a full theory as impossible, since the goods
that people seek are, even after careful reflection, incommensurable.53
They cannot be brought together in a single, unified account of the
good.54
With this, of course, the ultimate goal of moral inquiry in both
Aristotelian and Thomistic ethics is abandoned, at least for public
purposes, and a reconciliation of the requirements of moral theology and
public discourse becomes impossible. But one need not go that far to call
Murray’s aspirations for public argument into question. Disagreements
about the good will persist, and the practical problem for a modern
society is not to resolve them, but to construct rules for public, political
discourse that keep such disagreements out of elections, legislation, and
judicial decisions, and avoid deploying the coercive power of the state for
reasons that cannot be generally understood and evaluated.55
John Courtney Murray’s acknowledgement in We Hold These Truths
that the public consensus was a need rather than a fact suggests in its own
way the importance of the renewal of political philosophy that has
occurred in the half century after he wrote. However, the effect of many
of these developments has been to question whether there can be a public
discussion of the human good, especially one in which religious ideas
play a large role in shaping our understanding of what that good is.56
Murray’s natural law tradition and, more broadly, the idea of a “common
good,” assumes that such discussions are both possible and necessary.
His own case for the public consensus largely involves drawing on a wide
range of historical figures who, on his account, share those
assumptions.57 But the new case for the public consensus after Murray
wrote often argues that it can best be constructed by bypassing the
questions of human good. Steven Pinker’s currently popular defense of
Enlightenment rationalism adds the point that when religious convictions
52.
53.
54.
55.

JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 201 (1993).
ISAIAH BERLIN, LIBERTY 212–17 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002).
Id.
RAWLS, supra note 52, at 223–27; ROBERT AUDI & NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION
IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE: THE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN POLITICAL DEBATE 16–17
(1997).
56. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 93–95.
57. Id. at 44–48.
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are mixed with public choices, they are positively dangerous to the
justice, tranquility, and liberty that a democratic argument is supposed to
establish.58
Behind many of these theories, there is a pragmatic wisdom that resists
constructing a more elaborate metaphysical foundation for the public
consensus than is strictly necessary for the occasion. And more recent
commentators remind us how deeply the work of Rawls and Berlin are
rooted in their own experiences of war, intolerance, and political
repression.59 The tragedies of the twentieth century heightened awareness
among today’s liberal theorists are that they are the heirs of Locke, Hume,
and Rousseau, whose demands for tolerance and freedom were a response
to a century of European religious conflict.60
Murray certainly understood the importance of freedom of conscience
and religious liberty. But he might ask today whether we can advance the
public argument without risking some quite specific claims about the
human good in relation to the matters that are under discussion, whether
this involves human sexuality, or economic security, or health care, or
educational opportunity. And he might well have argued that one thing
the Catholic tradition brings to the public discussion is the Augustinian
idea that all goods are ordered in relation to one another by the relation
that all of them have to God, and the idea that over a lifetime of
experience, people can develop a reasonable apprehension of what that
order is.61
In a time when intolerance and intimidation are powerful forces in
politics everywhere, the public theologian needs to speak up for freedom
of thought and freedom of speech, and for individual rights and political
equality. But, where those conditions are met and the political argument
is well underway, there is surely also a place for the question, “Is it
good?” What vision of human flourishing does a particular course of
action imply? And what claims does this good make against the other
goods and resources that would be required to realize it? A thin theory of
the good will either leave those questions unanswered or insist that the
claims of the good extend only to the minimal requirements of survival
58. STEVEN PINKER, ENLIGHTENMENT NOW: THE CASE FOR REASON, SCIENCE, HUMANISM,
AND PROGRESS 30–31 (2018).
59. See JOHN RAWLS, A BRIEF INQUIRY INTO THE MEANING OF SIN AND FAITH: WITH “ON MY
RELIGION” 261–63 (Thomas Nagel ed., 2009) (discussing Rawls’s various phases of religiosity);
see generally MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, ISAIAH BERLIN: A LIFE (1998).
60. See PINKER, supra note 58, at 200–01 (discussing the wars and conflict of Europe
throughout the twentieth century and how some liberal theorists concluded that the end of these
conflicts meant the world had generally decided that democracy was the best form of government).
61. Augustine of Hippo, The Catholic Way of Life and the Manichean Way of Life, in 19 THE
WORKS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE: THE MANICHEAN DEBATE 16, 49 (Boniface Ramsey ed., 2006).
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and human dignity. An Augustinian understanding of human good will
insist that if public argument means anything, it has to be able to take on
more complex questions than the thin theories will allow.62
Public argument about these complex questions will always be
unfinished, as Murray understood, but what we learn from the history of
modern thought is that the attempt to reduce either doctrinal or political
truth to a set of universal, rational principles does not provide the
resolution that the theorists promise. Contextualized skills of
interpretation and understanding—hermeneutics, rather than logic—are
required. Paradoxically, these skills secure peace because they keep the
argument going. It is the attempts to end the argument, whether by force
or by logic, that lead to polarization, or to smoldering resentments that
break out into civic wildfires.
Beyond reasserting a historical claim that the liberal critics are
mistaken because questions about the good have always been part of the
public consensus that grounds American constitutionalism in natural law
thinking, Murray might today feel constrained to argue that raising these
questions about the human good is itself an assertion of religious
freedom. Even if the prevailing case for the public consensus insists on a
thin theory of the good or shrugs off attempts to order incommensurable
goods in relation to one another, the Christian theologian must articulate
in public this idea of an ordered, coherent good, which is the natural
destination of human life. In Murray’s thought, however, this exercise of
religious freedom is never asserted simply for its own sake or solely in
the interest of the church. To ask, “Is it good?” is to assert the need for a
public consensus of a certain kind, one that does not regard the public
argument as finished when the relevant interests have been balanced and
the parties announce that they are satisfied. To ask, “Is it good?” suggests
that the public discussions are always oriented beyond the immediate
problems to be solved. To ask, “Is it good?” inquires into what kind of
persons this choice will make us and suggests a distinction between the
kind of persons we ought to be, and the kind we are, or say we want to
be. To ask, “Is it good?” claims the freedom to set public discussions in
that framework, even when it might be more conclusive or less
contentious if we restrict the ultimate questions to more private settings.
So that is the first background question behind all the more specific
62. This point is not made only by those who have an explicit theology of the good. William
Galston and Michael Sandel have suggested that revisions of liberalism are necessary to allow more
political consideration of the human good, and Galston emphasizes that these have made their way
into our public discourse at crucial points in history, whether our political theories allow for it or
not. See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE PLURALISM
FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 41 (2002); see also MICHAEL J. SANDEL, PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY: ESSAYS ON MORALITY IN POLITICS 224–30 (2005).

2018]

Religious Freedom and Public Argument

39

questions about religious freedom and social policy: “Is it good?”
V. IS IT POLITICS?
Nevertheless, if a contemporary John Courtney Murray were to assert
the importance of questions about the good as part of the public
consensus, a chorus of liberal theorists from all sorts of contractarian,
communitarian, and utilitarian perspectives might immediately reply,
“This is exactly what we were afraid of.” They would insist that once you
admit those claims into public discourse, you create a situation in which
proximate questions about public policy get subordinated to ultimate
questions about human destiny. The theologians and religious leaders
who insist on raising such questions, they might add, are precisely the
ones who will not be satisfied with leaving those questions open. First,
they will insist on the freedom to raise the questions. Then, they will insist
on imposing their own answers.
We have to concede that their point has some relevance in the present
era of global religious extremism. In the United States, too, religious
polarization means that those who enter the public argument with their
religious identity on full display often demonstrate the risks of religious
conflict more clearly than the rewards of consensus. The reasons to worry
about what will happen if public discussions are opened to religious
arguments are perhaps more obvious than they were when political
philosophers first began to construct the case for a minimalist public
consensus around various “thin” theories of the good. But, the most
recent versions of liberal theory read this argument back into history in a
way that has the odd effect of polarizing the argument about polarization.
Neither liberal theorists nor Christian theologians seem to think that a
public argument of the sort that Murray had in mind is possible, or ever
has been possible. And each side blames the other for the problem.
On what we may, for the moment, call the “liberal” side, the claim is
that modern politics only became possible when people stopped taking
religion seriously and agreed to refer the traditions and beliefs that
divided them to reason and common human experience.63 The most
recent liberal thinkers, developing the historical side of this argument,
will acknowledge that it was a fine thing when people stopped
persecuting one another for their beliefs and started talking about
tolerance and religious freedom. But, they will add, it is a mistake to think
that there is anything about religious belief in particular that deserves
special consideration. Everything that it is important to protect can be
encompassed within freedom of speech, freedom of choice, freedom of
association, or other generally recognized rights, without making a
63. See generally PINKER, supra note 58.
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special case for religious freedom, which has a troublesome genealogy
that ties it too closely to unreasoned and unreasonable commitments for
courts and legislatures to balance claims for religious freedom against
other freedoms and public purposes.64
But there is also a theological version of this reading of liberal theory
back into political history. In this version, modernity, even before it gave
rise to political liberalism, was hostile to Christian truth and the virtues it
sustains.65 What becomes more and more clear over the course of modern
history is that Christian truth is not only contested, it is basically
incomprehensible to those who do not share it.66 A public argument of
the sort that Murray conceived, in which there is a dialogue between
Catholic faith and constitutional democracy about the requirements of
justice, the scope of law, and the limits of freedom, turns out to be as
illusory from this theological perspective as a serious treatment of
religious freedom is for the recent theorists of liberalism.
Understandably, there are major disagreements among those who hold
this position about what we are supposed to do about it. Some seem to
hope for a restoration of a unified Christian worldview, or at least want
to talk about what the world would be like if such a restoration could be
achieved. Others, ironically, appear to claim the protections of liberal
religious liberty to ensure that they can live according to the requirements
of their Christian faith in a society that does not share it. Still others,
perhaps most consistently, suggest withdrawal into communities of
Christian identity.67
In various ways, then, the recent polarization in thinking about
religious freedom and the public role of religion challenges Murray’s
effort to construct the case for a public consensus. It is not just that the
public consensus is not a fact. According to these new versions of both
the secular and the theological critiques, the public consensus is not a
64. See, e.g., BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2014).
65. See PATRICK J. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED 21–30 (2018) (describing the three
main efforts that supported the revolution in thought and practice, which include a description of
hostility to Christian truth and virtues).
66. STANLEY HAUERWAS, WITH THE GRAIN OF THE UNIVERSE: THE CHURCH’S WITNESS AND
NATURAL THEOLOGY 15 (2001) (“From the perspective of those who think we must first ‘prove’
the existence of god before we can say anything else about god, the claim by Christians that God
is Trinity cannot help but appear a ‘confessional’ assertion that is unintelligible for anyone who is
not already a Christian.”).
67. See ROD DREHER, THE BENEDICT OPTION: A STRATEGY FOR CHRISTIANS IN A POSTCHRISTIAN NATION 123 (2017) (discussing how authentic renewal must be achieved through
families and local church communities, not through politics). Alasdair MacIntyre closes his
indictment of modern moral thought in After Virtue with this memorable image: “We are waiting
not for a Godot, but for another – doubtless very different – St. Benedict.” MACINTYRE, supra note
20, at 263.
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need. Indeed, a public consensus that would provide a framework in
which faith could engage the important problems of contemporary
society may not even be possible.
It is hard to know what John Courtney Murray would make of this.
After all, he spent decades trying to convince his Catholic critics that the
idea of religious freedom and human dignity that “has been impressing
itself more and more deeply on the consciousness of contemporary man”
was compatible with Catholic truth and historically grounded in Catholic
thought.68 Today, he might again have to argue with theologians who find
these humanitarian ideals alien to the claims of Catholic truth, while he
would encounter secular thinkers who would be happy to embrace his
account of the religious origins of human dignity precisely because they
think this provides an excellent reason to reject the idea and reconstruct
public discourse instead around some other, more secular starting point.
Murray might respond to these broad challenges to his theological
perspective by turning the debate to more specific, contemporary
problems, as he did with his interlocutors in the 1950s. 69 It is a curious
fact that both sides in our recently polarized debate about structure of
public argument rely heavily on broad generalizations about modern
history.70 Their arguments are engaging, particularly for theologians,
who can rather easily be drawn into an argument about whether Martin
Luther or William of Ockham is most to blame for the collapse of liberal
democracy. But readers who have worked their way through both Steven
Pinker’s Enlightenment Now and Patrick Deneen’s Why Liberalism
Failed could be excused for thinking that these two interesting books
must be about the intellectual histories of two different planets.71
Murray was far better prepared than most theologians today to
participate in this kind of historical speculation, but he was more
concerned with understanding the questions his contemporaries were
really asking. The first reformulations of political liberalism that took
shape in the decades just after Murray’s death were not so much
Enlightenment critiques of religion as they were cases for a pragmatic
politics. Rawls, Berlin, and Audi did not set out with a specific purpose
68. The quotation is from the opening sentence of Dignitatis Humanae, the Declaration on
Religious Liberty issued by the Second Vatican Council. Murray played an important role in
drafting this document and offered his own interpretation of it in JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY,
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: CATHOLIC STRUGGLES WITH PLURALISM 205–17 (J. Leon Hooper ed.,
1993). See also HUDOCK, supra note 2, at 150 (explaining various cardinals’ and bishops’
viewpoints on the schema on religious freedom).
69. See MURRAY, supra note 3, at 139 (beginning his discussion of “the school problem”).
70. See PINKER, supra note 58, at 227–28 (noting how all parts of the world have generally
become more liberal since the 1960s).
71. Compare PINKER, supra note 58, with DENEEN, supra note 65.
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to exclude religious thought from public discussions. But they were
worried on some good evidence that people who enter these discussions
with the conviction that they already have all the answers will also be
quick to impose their answers on others who happen not to know for sure
that they believe. John Rawls called these systems of belief
“comprehensive” doctrines.72 He acknowledged that a lot of people hold
them and that they are unlikely to disappear, but he thought that the task
of a liberal democracy is to make sure that they do not become an issue
in political life.73 If that seemed to be an exaggerated concern in the early
1970s, subsequent decades of religious activism for both conservative
and progressive causes suggest that Rawls was on to something.
So, Murray might have allowed the liberal theorists to pose their own
question in the unfinished argument. If we allow the public theologian to
ask, “Is it good?,” we must also allow the secular critic to ask, “Is it
politics?” That is, are we here within the realm of contingent truths that
might be otherwise, where shared experience is important, and all
solutions are imperfect, impermanent, and subject to what Reinhold
Niebuhr called “the irony of history?”74 Or are we dealing with truths that
cannot be questioned? Religious activists sometimes seem to avoid
questions about the details of policy by grounding their claims in biblical
images and language, so that it becomes more and more difficult to
distinguish their political program from an altar call. But it is not religion
alone that pushes our public discourse in that direction, perhaps not even
religion chiefly. In place of a theology that is overtly political, we now
have politics that is quasi-theological. Party programs have taken on a
kind of ideological rigidity that makes them invulnerable to criticism or
refinement. If there is no “growing end” to the public argument and no
place where we are figuring out new solutions to changing problems, then
the task of political leadership is to mobilize the “base,” reinforce the core
convictions, and hope that intimidation or indifference will lead those
who think differently just to stay home on election day. This polarization
is the political counterpart to the particularized theology that regards
Christian truth as incomprehensible to those who do not share it.
Murray, then, would continue to press the need for a public consensus
that could admit a rich, “thick,” and detailed account of human goods into
public arguments. But he would also understand the concerns that lead
secular theorists to wonder whether the ideologues—religious and
political—who demand enactment of their doctrines in their
comprehensive entirety are really serious about politics. Murray saw
72. RAWLS, supra note 52, at 13.
73. Id. at 13–15.
74. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE IRONY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 2 (1952).
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politics as a locus of Christian service, rather than as a locus of truth. He
never read Rawls’s Theory of Justice, let alone the later works in which
Rawls tried to accommodate and restrain what he called “comprehensive
doctrines,” but he might ask whether the very idea of a “comprehensive
doctrine” mistakes the nature of Christian political convictions.75
Christian traditions, and perhaps religious traditions generally, are full of
fine distinctions between the temporary and the eternal. They follow in
various ways Saint Thomas Aquinas’s principle that as our practical
conclusions get more remote from first principles, they become less
certain.76 In Murray’s account of the public argument, doctrine provides
a framework in which pressing questions of policy can be discussed and
limited, but appropriate versions of a just resolution can be agreed.
Murray himself coupled his discussion of the “school question” with a
candid admission that, although he could make a case for the goods at
stake, he did not know, in detail, what justice requires.77 He could hardly
have regarded any political solution to the problem as part of a
comprehensive doctrine. Rather than the thin theory of the good being a
practical restraint on the excessive claims of comprehensive doctrines,
the idea of a “comprehensive doctrine” may itself be dependent on a thin
theory of the good.
CONCLUSION
The theological task that John Courtney Murray set for himself,
beginning in the 1940s, was to understand Catholic doctrine in relation to
the changing conditions of Christian life. For him, this was never a matter
of seeing how far social reality could be brought into conformity with
some pre-existing religious ideal. He was a participant in a public
argument, involved in an ongoing process in which he learned new things
about both the possibilities of politics and the truths of faith.
What he learned that was most important for the future of the Church
was to see religious freedom as a requirement of human dignity, rather
than a right derived from possession of the truth. But he also came to see
how that freedom and dignity come to full expression through
participation in that public argument. Freedom of religion is not just
something that must be protected from politics. When human dignity is
respected, faith is strengthened, and religious life is empowered by the
contributions Christians make to the common good. Freedom of belief,
and even freedom for religious practice, fall short of the freedom to bring
75. See generally RAWLS, supra note 10; RAWLS, supra note 52, at 13.
76. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, Pt. I-II, q. 94, art. 4 (R.J. Henle trans., 1993).
77. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 139.
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a rich, “thick,” and detailed account of human goods into the public
argument, to see those ideas take root and be transformed, and thus over
time to achieve what Augustine called “the way of life by which we may
merit to know what we believe.”78
There are many threats to religious freedom in today’s world, and it is
important to be concerned about the uses of coercion, discrimination, and
intimidation that make religious life impossible for millions of people
who live as refugees, suffer exploitation, or struggle for dignity as
members of a religious minority. But where a measure of religious
freedom and political order has been secured, the question of religious
freedom is also about whether political discourse can accommodate
serious reflection about what makes for a good life, what makes a good
person, and what a society needs to make good lives and good persons
possible. For that discourse to be possible, in turn, those who have ideas
about these goods must be prepared to join the argument, to act and not
just to proclaim, to put their ideas to the test and not just demand the
freedom to hold them. The two questions posed by Murray’s
understanding of religious freedom—“Is it good?” and “Is it politics?”—
remain relevant even under the quite different terms on which we live our
religious and political lives today, and both questions must be answered.

78. Augustine, supra note 61, at 49.

